America and the Middle East

[What'sinaname]

[pietillidie]

[David]

There's a gulf between will and capacity, but there's also something in between those two poles, which could (with apologies to the Fyre Festival organisers) be called the "Let's just do it and be legends" approach. Lots of countries act beyond their means, sometimes with catastrophically self-destructive consequences – and last time I checked, the world isn't a rational place, and America is certainly no exception.

I could repeat nearly everything you've written above for Russia, and add much more besides. No-one now can argue that Russia is any less of an economic basket-case or shell of its former self – indeed, you've said that here yourself many times – and yet Putin doesn't seem to have gotten the memo in terms of geopolitical ambitions, hence why Russia continues to throw its weight around in Ukraine and the Caucasus, not so long ago nearly single-handedly kept the Assad regime in power in Syria and defeated ISIS, and continues to prop up Iran and its various Middle Eastern proxies while sending mercenaries off to enact regime change in various African countries. Can they afford to do all that with their limited resources, which have come under even greater strain thanks to the recent sanctions? I don't know, maybe not. But the crucial thing is this: it hasn't stopped them.

As it stands, there's not much real estate left in the Middle East that isn't aligned with either US and Russia and at least somewhat dependent on one or the other (Turkey is probably the one power in the region that is relatively independent). This has nothing to do with Cold War hallucinations; anyone can see that both powers are substantially diminished, particularly so in Russia's case, and yet in many ways they continue to act like it's 1962.

Much of this discussion – or, at least, your original argument with MTTM – is about the word "control". To me, that's a mostly semantic issue. Does the US "control" Australia? Not literally, in the sense that they couldn't give a toss about most of our domestic policy debates, and perhaps not even in a broader definition given we in theory could defy them (and who knows, maybe one day we'll live to see it happen), but for all intents and purposes, they do. They say jump and we say how high. If that's not control, then it's close enough to satisfy any hegemonic superpower in the market for client states.

And the same goes to varying extents for Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan and now Iraq. They're all economically and militarily dependent on the US, and all toe the line on the things that matter. Sure, Israel acts up from time to time, but that's because they know they have the leeway to do so. Personally, I don't much care what anyone labels that situation, whether it be control, hegemony, "spheres of influence" or whatever – as long as we're seeing the same thing, that's all that matters. And if the US have reached the point of losing interest in adding members to that club or neutralising the opposition bloc, as Stui was arguing a couple of pages back, then I'll eat both my shoes. Of course this is silly because we all know that Washington still considers Iran an enemy, still has military bases all over the place, and Ron Paul isn't the president.

I think you may have gotten the wrong end of the stick from the outset because MTTM might have been hinting at the prospect of a unilateral US invasion of Iran. For what it's worth, I think that's unlikely and that that probably does have more to do with lack of capacity than lack of will. I also think it's a prospect that's diminished substantially since, say, 2008. But just as the Soviet Union and China weren't directly confronted during the Cold War, you can expect that proxy skirmishes will continue in places like Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and that could lead to war. For a country that could easily have Donald Trump as president again in a year's time, you'd be brave to confidently predict any positive or sane outcome here.

[pietillidie]

^Just quickly, no, Russia is a case in point of what I'm saying. Like the US they can't do much except creep over one of their borders and bomb far off lands no one (shamefully) cares about; it's not like they're invading Romania or Belgium. They're basically grabbing what they can now precisely for the reasons outlined: war is too much trouble even for the superpower, while major war is out of the question, so keeping just tolerably below the threshold is the right ploy for Russia's level of distant theft, and using the interconnected economy to rattle markets and polities is ample weaponry.

Just look at how the GOP dimwits have fallen for it, such that getting funding for defending Ukraine from violent invasion is like getting blood from a stone in Congress.

Nutterayhoo is doing exactly the same thing; the US is too divided for Biden to sort the SOB out good and proper, because Trumpists will suddenly pretend they care about Israel. They don't, but the politics is so dumb they will take up absolutely any contrary position and flip 180 degrees the next day if need be. And like Putin, Nutteryahoo knows it.

This is what these parasites like Trump, Bolsonaro and Orban do, trained by the king parasite, Putin. He started pressuring fossil fuels just after the pandemic supply shock to rattle people and make them turn away from his thuggery, and once that started losing effect he went for wheat and food prices as a second act. (Too bad if the inflation suffering extended all the way down to Africa and the war costs his own people at the same time, effing psychopath).

I don't know what you're seeing (perhaps in the rest of your post which i'll read later), but exactly the same dynamics explain Putin's strategy. Egg-blooody-zactly! Putin is the master of using leverage because while he can't afford long wars, he knows we have even less tolerance for them.

[Magpietothemax]

[Magpietothemax]

[pietillidie]

[What'sinaname]

[Magpietothemax]

US just vetoed yet again another UN resolution for an immediate, sustained ceasefire. Yet according to some here, the US is not the main force of destruction in the Middle East.

[pietillidie]

^The Security Council has five members with veto power, even going back to a period of overwhelming US dominance in the 1960s. And we all know the rest often hide behind the US veto, letting the US wear the ignominy.

But at least you've gone from the term 'control' to the US being 'the main force'. As amply explained, being the superpower ipso facto means being the main force, but being the main force on a multipolar planet means far less than being the main force among devastated post-war nations and a peasant third world, something that started falling apart in the 1990s.

Everything has changed, and the two lost wars this century were the last hurrah for the kind of dominance you so desperately wish to defend. As further explained, only extreme dominance gives you anything like 'control' in a world of rival blocs and WMDs. And those days are well and truly done.

You're like the inverse of Trumpists: they too can't let fantasies of American control go, but for very different reasons. It's as if you mourn for the good old days when there was only one Great Satan. With your head trapped in the past, it would only be fitting for you to pick up where your education left off, i.e., when outdated Marxian thought rightly started being deconstructed.

You don't have to buy into poststructuralism to take something from its critique, which deals with the subtle way over-claims like 'control' distort and reinforce power. Whether you frame it like Chomsky as somerthing you've always known, and therefore a truism, is up to you. Here's a book written by an old lecturer of mine:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.cttts7zc

Again, not my genre and not the way I'd make the point, but a valid point and necessary excursion nonetheless.

You can't claim authority in the area of business, capital, economics and social theory if you've never studied classical economics, never engaged in business (and met payroll), never led an organisation, and never considered major alternative critiques to your pet theories, FFS. That's where I part ways with the old left; as much as I agree with a lot of its sentiment, it is ridiculously world ignorant and grossly over-claims accordingly.

[Magpietothemax]

[pietillidie]

^But you've just jumped from generic control of the planet to the funding of its most famously close ally. And ironically, all of the talk in America is about it being led by the nose by that ally and its fruitbat leader.

And if you bothered to read any poststructuralism, you'd know that's exactly what it predicts: i.e., that the discourse becomes all-encompassing and dictates the options. So, the old idea that 'Israel is our closest ally that must be supported' just can't be overcome, even though everyone knows Nutteryahoo is a fruitcake and doesn't represent 'Israel' as a whole.

The discourse controls the acceptable idea space, which in turn controls the action space.

Of course, this is significantly because Trump will simply pretend he cares about Israel and use it as a wedge and fund-raising tool, but that's part of my argument: it takes overwhelming control to have control, and that no longer exists in a multipolar world. Completely contrary to your view, the US is actually being held in checkmate on this.

And that's exactly what I've been saying: they can't control a tiny ally, can't protect their borders, can't fend off the worst effects of financial crises and pandemics, and can't do all kinds of things. Because the world has changed, if indeed America ever had as much control as we used to imagine (Vietnam, anyone?).

These kinds of contradictions - not the old-school Marxian capital accumulation contradictions you refuse to let go - are precisely why people started moving away from grand Marxian theory.

You can keep imagining what you believed as a teenager ought to suffice once for all time, or you can upgrade your thinking like most adults.

[David]

[pietillidie]

^That's not what the polling shows, as far as I can tell. The constants are fear of and contempt for Hamas, followed by contempt for Netanyahu. Naturally, people want security, so under duress they're going to tolerate overkill (literally, in this case) if it secures their immediate safety. But very little of that is translating into support for Nutteryahoo beyond hardline vote, which only ever seems to be about a third of the country.

[Culprit]

^^The Hardliners are having more children than the moderates so the situation is only going to get worse in years to come. Genocide is the hardliner's goal and taking over Gazza is the first step. Palestinian hardliners have more children than the moderates so there's an increase in Hamas numbers. There will never be peace in the Middle East whilst hardliners are in charge of both sides.